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of experts ready to exercise their trained judgments on the multitude
of complex problems constantly brought before them. Thus, assuming
that there should be a separation of powers, the decision in the principal
case seems to be desirable regardless of which interpretation is placed
on it. Under the first interpretation the decision represents a stride
toward separation; under the second, total separation is achieved.

JOHN R. INGLE
Corporations-Non-Profit Corporations Engaging in Commercial
Enterprises
The doctrine of ultra vires in general corporation law has undergone
considerable statutory revision in recent years.1 The scope of this Note
is to survey briefly the application of this doctrine to the narrower field
of non-profit corporations, as such application appears in the comparative
paucity of case law.
In the recent Georgia case of Church of God of the Union Assembly
v. Carmical,2 the defendant church, incorporated generally to promote
the interests of religion, was engaging in the auction business in competition with plaintiff auctioneer. The court denied an injunction against
the church's conducting the business, holding that the plaintiff lacked
sufficient interest to complain about the alleged ultra vires act. The
point was made that the court was conceding, not holding, that the
business activity was ultra vires. While this case does not reach the
question of whether a non-profit corporation may or may not operate
a business for profit, it serves to point up the problem inherent in
considering the powers which may be exercised by this class of corporate
entities.
Generally speaking, the problem of whether to allow or enjoin
business activity by a non-profit corporation has presented itself to the
courts in three situations: (1) where such activity is expressly prohibited by the corporation's charter; (2) where it is not contemplated
by the charter; and (3) where it is provided for in the charter, but such
a provision is beyond statutory authorization.
In State ex rel. v. Southern Junior College,3 there was an express
provision in the charter that the corporation should not possess the
power to engage in any kind of trading operation. In an action brought
by the state on relation of citizens engaged in the printing business, it
was held that the prohibitory clause prevented the college from operating
I BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 108 (Rev. ed. 1946). For a typical statement
of the ultra vires rule as it is found in modern statutes, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-18
(Supp. 1957).
2 104 S.E.2d 912 (Ga. 1958).
' 166 Tenn. 535, 64 S.W.2d 9 (1933).
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its printshop commercially, even though the profits derived from the
operation were applied to the general educational purposes of the school.
An early Georgia case 4 is illustrative of the second situation. The
church there chartered a steamboat for an excursion to raise funds to
pay off the indebtedness incurred in erecting a new church building.
The defense of ultra vires was upheld against the church's suit to recover for the loss of profits resulting from the failure to make the trip.
The court thought this activity was an attempt by the church to conduct
a day's carrying business with the public, a venture not contemplated
in the objects of association. However, a contrary result was reached
by an Ohio court 5 where the permitted business activity was selling
particular merchandise to its members for a profit which was properly
used to defray the non-profit corporation's expenses.
That a non-profit corporation cannot assure itself of the power to
invade the business world by simply including that power in its charter
is pointed out by the cases in the third category. On much the same
facts presented by the Southern Junior College case, the Tennessee
court two years later again enjoined a publishing enterprise by a nonprofit corporation. 6 But instead of prohibiting this activity, the charter
in the latter case expressly authorized it. The court held that the
operation did not come within the purview of any of the authorized
objectives set out in the controlling statute, 7 pointing to a statutory
prohibition 8 against such corporations engaging in trading operations.
In State ex rel. Dade County Kennel Club, Inc. v. State Racing
Comm'n,9 a kennel club organized for charitable and benevolent purposes
was refused a permit to operate a racetrack, even though the power to
build and operate greyhound racing tracks was expressly granted by
the club's approved charter. The proposed act was declared contrary to
the statute 0 authorizing non-profit incorporation.
Apparently there are no North Carolina decisions in point. But
there is no reason to believe that our court would hold differently from
other courts; i.e., when called upon in a proper proceeding, it would
probably enjoin a corporation organized for non-profit purposes from
engaging in purely commercial enterprises in competition with business
' Harriman v. First Bryan Baptist Church, 63 Ga. 186 (1879).
' State ex rel. Bartlett v. National Ass'n of Angling and Casting Clubs, 72
Ohio App. 319, 51 N.E.2d 662 (1943). Accord, Emrick v. Pennsylvania R.R.
YMCA, 69 Ohio App. 353, 43 N.E.2d 733 (1942) (operating restaurant) and
Eads v. YWCA, 325 Mo. 577, 29 S.W.2d 701 (1930) (renting building).
8 State ex rel. v. Southern Publishing Ass'n, 169 Tenn. 257, 84 S.W.2d 580
(1935). For a discussion of the power of religious, educational or charitable
corporations to engage in business for profit, see Annot., 100 A.L.R. 579 (1936).
TEN. CODE ANN. § 48-1101 (1955).
8
TLEN. CODE ANN.
10116 Fla. 144, 156
FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 48-1109 (1955).

So. 343 (1934).
§ 617.01 (1956).
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organizations or individuals. It seems worthy of comment, however,
that an express prohibition against engaging in trading operations does
not appear in our new Non-Profit Corporation Act."
The North Carolina act provides that non-profit corporations may
be formed for any lawful purpose;12 and in order to carry out the
purposes stated in the charter, the power is given to "acquire, own, hold,
improve, use and otherwise deal in and with, real or personal property."' 18
There is a general grant of all powers necessary or convenient to effect
the corporation's purposes,' 4 plus freedom of charter amendment so long
as the charter as amended contains only provisions lawful under the
chapter. 5 The authority to assert lack of power to act is given to the
Attorney General in an action to dissolve the corporation or to enjoin
it from transacting unauthorized business.' 8
In conclusion, it appears that the trend toward liberalization of the
ultra vires doctrine as regards business corporations 17 has been carried
over to the non-profit field to a large extent. Perhaps excursions into
the commercial world which are flagrant departures from the purposes
of the corporation will continue to be enjoined; but, at the same time,
it would seem to be growing easier to bring business operations within
the protective veil of things incidental to the non-profit objectives stated
in the charter. The business corporation and private merchant may
well look with disfavor at the type of competition presented by these
"non-profit" corporations.
HAROLD L. WATERS

Criminal Law-Forgery-Use of Fictitious Name
In Hubsch v. United States,' a recent decision from the Fifth Circuit,
the defendant was indicted under the National Stolen Property Act2 on
"1N.C. GEN. STAT., ch. 55A (Supp. 1957). Although not specifically mentioned
in the case, such a prohibition is set out in the Georgia statute under which the
church
in the principal case was incorporated. GA. CODE ANN. § 22-401 (1935).
'2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-5 (Supp. 1957).
(Supp. 1957).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-15(b) (1)
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-15(b) (8) (Supp. 1957).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-34 (Supp. 1957).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-17(3) (Supp. 1957).
BALLANTINE, op. cit. Smpra note 1.
1256 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1958).
1

'
7

48 STAT. 794 (1934) (later codified as 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311, 2314-15 (1952 and
Supp. IV 1957)). The portion of § 2314 under which defendant was indicted provides in pertinent part as follows:

Whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, transports in interstate or

foreign commerce any falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities,
knowing the same to have been falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited
[shall be punished].

